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RECENT DECISIONS
CONDITIONAL SALS--WAIVER OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS By
VENDEE. Defendant sold a milk drying machine to one Heim under

a conditional sale contract, the price being $12,000. When some
$6,000 had been paid thereon, the vendee went into bankruptcy. A
number of conferences thereafter between the trustee in bankruptcy
and defendant were held by the Court to constitute an implied waiver
of the provisions of Sec. 65 of the Personal Property Law. The
trustee then disposed of his interest in the machine to the plaintiff,
a purchaser with notice. Defendant subsequently retook the machine, but failed to sell within 60 days. Plaintiff sued to recover
the amount paid on the machine. HELD, that he could not recover;
that he was bound by the trustee's waiver of the statutory benefits,
and that a conditional vendee or his trustee in bankruptcy, after default by the vendee, -could waive the provisions of Sec. 65 of the
Personal Property Law. (Breakstone v. Buffalo Foundry & Machine Co., Appellate Division, First Department, April 1915.)

The vendor, in a conditional sale contract, upon retaking the
goods after default by the vendee. must hold the same for 30 days
to enable the vendee to complete his contract, and if the vendee does

not so complete, must sell the goods within the 30 days next following; and if the goods are not sold within the second 30 days,
the vendee or his successor in interest may recover back the amounts
paid on the contract. (Personal Property Law, Sec. 65.) Consti-
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tutional and statutory rights may be waived (Matter of Cooper, 93
N. Y. 507); but'a provision in an executory contract to waive a
statutory benefit will not be enforced when against the public policy
of the state. (Kneettle v, Newcomb, 22 N. Y. 249). If the contract is reallyone for the sale of goods, a provision that the amounts
paid are to be charged as rent until the whole sum is paid will be
disregarded as an attempt to defeat the statute. (Hoffman v. Sewing Machine Co., 123 App. Div. 166; Hurley v. Gas Co., 144 App.
Div. 300). It has been held that an agreement in the conditional
sales contract to waive the provisions of Sec. 65 of the Personal
Property Law is invalid as against public policy (Crowe v. Carbonic
Co., 208 N. Y. 396; Hurley v. Gas Co., Supra) ; but this objection,
it would seem, does not hold where the waiver is made after default
by the vendee, and the principal case expressly distinguishes Crowe
v. Carbonic Co., Supra, on this point. The statute is for the protection of the vendee, and a clause in the contract waiving its benefits is held void to prevent the imposition of harsh terms by the
vendor. Where, however, the matter has reached the stage of default by the vendee, this reasoning is no longer applicable, and the
general rule that a man may waive his statutory rights should prevail. In this the principal case appears sound.

INCHOATE RIGHT OF DowER-LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. The plaintiff did not join in her husband's conveyance to the defendants.
The defendants drilled and are drilling wells for gas and oil. The
husband is still alive. HELD, the plaintiff cannot enjoin the defendants from so drilling (Rumsey v. Sullivan et al., 150 N. Y. S. 287).
In a dictum in this case it is said, "Dower does not result from any
contractual relation between husband and wife, either express or
implied, and the legislature has the power to alter, abolish or diminish such right while it remains inchoate, (Moore v. New York,
8 N. Y. 110; 59 Am. Dec. 473; 14 Cyc. 887)."
In view of the tendency to abolish dower, this is important.
The great weight of authority seems to be that the legislature may
abolish the inchoate right of dower. (Morrison v. Rice, 35 Minn.
436; 29 N. W. 168; Chapman v. Chapman, 48 Kan. 636; 29 Pac.
1071; Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164; 90 Am. Dec. 322.) Dower
is not founded on contract within the meaning of the Constitution
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which prevents the passage of laws impairing obligations of contracts (Magee v. Young, Supra). Shankland, J., writing in the
case of Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N. Y. 245 at p. 250, seemed to believe
that legislation attempting to abolish the inchoate right of dower
would be contrary to the 10th section of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States
however, seems to follow the case of Magee v. Young, Supra. (See
Randall v. Krieger, 90 U. S.; 23 Wall. 137).
The dictum quoted from the main case seems to be sustained by
the citation of the learned Court. In Moore v. New York, Supra,
the plaintiff was the wife of a man who received compensation from
the defendant for land taken for a public use. A statute authorized
the defendant to take title and to make a just estimate of the damage of everyone interested in the land. The question was whether
the possibility of dower was an interest in the land within the purview of the statute and the Court held it was not. Moore.v. New
York, Supra, has been limited in the case of Simar v. Canaday, 53
N. Y. 298 at p. 304, to cases in which the State is a party exercising
the right of eminent domain. This however does not deny the
power of the legislature to abolish the inchoate right of dower, for,
it is submitted, that the very limitation of Moore v. New York as
stated in Sinar v. Canaday, admits of such a power.

SALts-AcTION FOR PURCAS. PRIC.. The Borough Bank
agreed on April 1, 1909, to repurchase from plaintiff $100.000 worth
of bonds at par, which plaintiff had received in part payment of a
debt due it from the Borough Bank, taking back bonds of the par
value of $25,000 on April 13. 1911, and of the par value of $75,000
on April 13, 1912. Plaintiff reserved a right to sell the bonds at
any time. Before the dates for repurchase the Borough Bank went
into liquidation, and tender was made to the Superintendent of
Banks. Before the date of tender plaintiff turned over all its assets
including these bonds to the Metropolitan Trust Company as security for a loan. By this transfer the Metropolitan Trust Company
was empowered to make any and all sales of the assigned property.
This advance was to be repaid August 12, 1912, but it was then renewed for a year longer. In a suit for the purchase prike, HrID,
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that plaintiff was entitled to recover the full contract price (Brooklyn Bank in the City of New York v. Borough Bank of Brooklyn,
App. Div. 2nd Dept., April 1915).
"The vendor of personal property in a suit against the vendee
for not taking and paying for the property, has the choice ordinarily
of either one of three methods to indemnify himself: (A) He may
store or retain the property for the vendee, and sue him for the entire purchase price; (B) He may sell the property, acting as the
agent for this purpose of the vendee, and recover the difference between the contract price and the price obtained on such resale; or
(C) He may keep the property as his own, and recover difference
between the market price at the time and place of delivery, and the
contract price." (Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72; Hayden v.
Demts, 53 N. Y. 426; Mason v. Decker, 72 N. Y. 595; Moore v.
Potter, 155 N. Y. 481; Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N. Y. 405; Gross
v. Ajelo, 132 App. Div. 25.) It would seem that the plaintiff by
pledging the bonds to the Metropolitan Trust Company, as security
for a loan, and giving to the Trust Company a power of sale, and
renewing the loan agreement after the tenders, treated the bonds
as its own, and was therefore entitled to recover only the difference
between the market price and the contract price, and not the purchase price. (See cases cited supra, and compare Okidhoma Vinegar Company v. Carter,116 Ga. 140.) If a stockbroker in a margin
transaction gives a power of sale to any party making him a loan
upon his customer's stock, he is guilty of a conversion (Strickland
v. Magoun, 119 App. Div. 113; Mayer v. Monzo, 151 App. Div.
866). The giving to a third party, the Metropolitan Trust Company, a power of sale over the bonds, seems inconsistent with the
notion that plaintiff was retaining the bonds for the vendee, and thus
entitling itself to recover the purchase price.

SEPARATION AGREMENTS-VALIDITY-STATUTES.

Husband and

wife were living apart. They entered into an agreement, by the
terms of which the wife was to receive a sum found to be onesixteenth of the husband's income. The wife was unable to maintain herself and child according to the standard adopted by her husband before separation. In an action to set aside the agreement,
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HEw, that when a wife is living apart from her husband under a
decree or a separation agreement, she has a right to obtain an
amount which will permit her to maintain a standard of living commensurate with the husband's income and the mode adopted by him
when the parties lived together. (Ducas v. Ducas, New York Law
Journal, April 8, 1915.)
At common law the unity of husband and wife was so complete
as to render void contracts made between them; there were not
two contracting parties. By Chap. 381, Laws of 1884, the wife was
given power to contract but was expressly denied the right to contract with her husband. More enlightened views came to prevail
after this act was passed and another step forward was taken when
equity specifically enforced contracts between husband and wife,
even though void at law, when some equitable consideration was
shown either upon the face of the instrument or-by extraneous proof
which would warrant equity's interposition. (Lawrence v. Lawrence, 32 Misc. at p. 505; Dean v. Metropolitan R. R., 119 N. Y.
at p. 547). Finally, by Sec. 21, Chap. 272, Laws of 1896, it was
provided that "a married woman has all the rights in respect to
property, real and personal, and to make contracts in respect thereto with any person, including her husband, * * *"as if she were unmarried; but a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve the husband from his liability to
support the wife." (Dom. Rel. Law Section 51.) This last clause
was very properly calculated to preserve the marital relation free
from the contractual whims of the parties. Consequently, it has
been uniformly held in this State that an agreement by a husband
and wife to separate is essentially a contract to alter the marriage
and hence void within this statutory inhibition. (Poillon v. Poillon,
49 A. D. 341; Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. 462.), Either party may
at their pleasure, revoke such an agreement. - (Gilbert v. Gilbert,
5 Misc. 555.) If, however, the parties'are actually living apart, an
agreement for the maintenance of the wife will be upheld by the
Courts, if it is in all respects fair and the free act of both parties.
(Duryea v'. Bliven, 122 N. Y. 567; Pettitt v. Pettitt, 107 N. Y. 677;
Johnson'v. Johnson, 206 N. Y. 561). Where the separation exists
as a fact and is not occasioned or produced by the contract, and the
provisions are equitable, the contract will be upheld; the consideration of the husband's agreement to pay being his release from
liability to support his wife. Pettitt v. Pettitt, supra. It must ap-
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pear on the record that the parties have actually separated and are
living apart. (Lawrence v. Lawrence, supra). The consideration for a separation agreement fails when the parties are reconciled
or resume cohabitation with an intent to reestablish the marital relation. (Zimtner v. Settle, 124 N. Y. 37). So long as it is observed by the husband, the agreement is a bar to the maintenance
of an action for separation by the wife and binding upon her as to
the amount to be paid.. (Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 643.) Consequently, when the wife thus binds herself and waives her statutory remedies, it is necessary that "she should be in possession of
every material fact affecting her act and it is the duty of the husband, he being in a position of trust, to disclose such facts." Such
agreements must be free from the taint of fraud or duress and must
be fair and adequate, considering the husband's circumstances.
(Hendrick v. Isaacs, 117 N. Y. 411). Because these requisites
were not observed and the wife had been overreached, the agreement in the principal case was set aside. It was further held that
the money received by the wife during her observance of the agreement. need not be returned as a condition precedent to maintaining
the action, since it had been spent in providing for herself and
child. (Hingerford v. Hingerford, 161 N. Y. 550).
The policy of the law in sustaining separation agreements fairly
entered into is probably correctly stated in Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch.
D. 605. "After all it might be better and more beneficial for married people to avoid in many cases the expense and scandal of suits
for divorce by settling their differences quietly, by the aid of friends
out of Court, although the consequences might be that they would
live separately." The theory of the English judges was that since
a wife could institute or defend a suit for divorce, she might also
enter into an agreement whereby such a suit might be avoided.
Hence we find in Pettitt v. Pettitt, supra: "In the pending action
for'divorce, thie plaintiff would have been entitled, if successful, to
a decree of separation and a suitabble allowance from the estate of
her husband for her support and maintenance. It is difficult to see
how it could be in accord with public policy to award such relief
and yet agiinst public policy for the husband to concede it in advance of the decree and as a compromise of the existing litigation.
Public policy does not turn on the question whether the husband
fights out the quarrel to final judgment." True enough, yet Courts
should never authorize or sanction separations "except on proof of
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a dereliction legally defined and declared sufficient and never on the
admissions or consent of the parties." (Bishop, Marr., Div. &
Separ., Vol. 1, p. 1265). In the absence of proof of the plaintiff's
allegations, the Court is forbidden to grant the separation.' Yet
"the parties may make an agreement, which will become an order of
the Court, to do without sentence the thing prayed, or enter into
any other reasonable form of separation and the Court will specifically enforce it." This is precisely the nature of separation agreements, and, strange as it may seem, they will be upheld on the
ground of public policy above alluded to, or will be set aside under
the tests set out in the cases cited.

BOOK REVIEWS
"A

by Renzo D. Bowers
(The V. H. Courtright Publishing Co.)

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAIVER,"

This work does not, like so many others, thresh old straw.
While the law of waiver has served as the subject of some admirable essays (see 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (Ist Ed.), 524,
title "Waiver"; 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.), 1089,
title, Id.), this is the first book, we believe, which is devoted exclusively to that topic. Hence, it is somewhat of a pioneer, and, as
such, naturally excites the keenest interest. As a treatise, however,
it must be confessed that the book is a disappointment.
Whether wisely or not, it has become customary for reviewers
to refrain from commenting upon the style displayed in a treatise.
But, at the risk of being accused of pedantry, we cannot forbear
alluding to the carelessness in composition, which is evidenced in
this work. The perspicuity of almost every page in the book might
be improved, by the judicious elimination of pleonasms. Frequently, the sentences in the work rival in length, but not in brilliancy of construction, those of Burke, as the following one (Sec.
196) well indicates: "Privileged communications between a patient
and his physician may be waived by the patient, or by his attorney.
personal representative, though not by an executor in an action to
revoke a will, heir at law, this however, being denied under a statute prohibiting a physician from testifying Ykithout the consent of
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his patient, assignee of an insurance policy beneficiary, guardian.
of a minor, parents of a child treated b$ the physician; but not,
however, by the husband of the patient, and it is even held that only
the patient can waive the privilege."
Even more serious, perhaps, than the long anl redundant sentences, which are so constantly indulged in, is the yiolation of the
King's English (see e.g., p. 21; where "either" is used instead of
"any"; and p. 23, where a sentence in Sec. 8 seems meaningless,
and p. 219, where two sentences in Sec. 220 are printed as one).
A distinguished jurist wisely has observed that "definitions are
dangerous" (Andrews Bros. Co. v,. Youngston Coke Co., 86 Fed.
Rep. 585, 588 per Lupton, J.). The truth of his observation is
sustained by this work. In it (Sec. 1), "waiver" is defined as "the

voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit." Notwithstanding its length, this definition is too narrow; it ignores the
qualification that an agreement- to waive a right is void, if it is contrary to public policy (see e. g., Mabee v. Crozier, 22 Hun. 264,
where an agreement to waive usury, and not to set it up as a defense, was held void).
Again, the author falls into a curious error, by asserting (Sec.
2) that a waiver "may be shown . . .. by the doing or forbearing
(sicl) to do something inconsistent with the existence of a right
or an intention to rely upon it." It is not a little surprising, at this
late day, to note a writer apparently doubting (Sec. 4) that considation is a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the request of the
promisor. In dealing with waivers contained in bills and notes
(Secs. 74, 75), the author ignores the section in the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (Sec. 81 of the New York act relating thereto). Indeedi a careful examination of the chapter on commercial
paper (p. 79, et seq.,) fails to disclose a single reference to the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, although, curiously enough, the
works of Ryles and Chitty are referred to.
On page 342, the author states (Sec. 343), without qualification,
that "a party cannot waive a tort and bring an action in assumpsit
against the tort feasor, except where the property has been converted into money or its equivalent." At page 348. however, this
is shown not to be the universal rule.
SAUL GoRDON.

